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HAMLINE LAW REVIEW
SETTLEMENT OF THE ACF CONTROVERSY: SISYPHUS AT
THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY
Robert Haskell Abrams'
The ancient Greek myth in which Sisyphus is condemned to
perpetually roll a massive boulder up a hill only to have it fall back down
now symbolizes repetitive, ultimately fruitless effort.2 The Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) basin rapidly has become the emblem of
Sisyphean water conflict in the eastern United States. It has the potential to
rival some of the West's long-running water disputes, although it will never
challenge the Colorado River in that regard. Formal evidence of conflict
over the use of the basin waters date back to the late 1980's, while the seeds
of coming dispute were probably visible some years earlier. The ACF
dispute has been through more than a decade of litigation that is on-going.4
The dispute has seen an interstate compact come and go. 5 By the time this
article appears, the dispute will be the subject of legislative proposals in
Congress.6 The dispute has been a topic of negotiations among many of the
key parties on numerous occasions, some broken off as recently as the time
this paragraph was being written.7 The dispute has spawned considerable
literature !8
1 Professor of Law, Florida A & M University, College of Law. The author
wishes to thank the Florida A & M University, College of Law for research support for this
effort.
2 See generally ELLIOTr M. SIMON, THE MYTH OF SIsYPuS: RENAISSANCE
THEORIES OF HUMAN PERFECTABILrTY (2007).
3 The legal history of the Colorado River is quite voluminous and gave rise to
the phrase, "the law of the river." See CoLo. RIVER COMM'N OF NEV., LAWS OF THE RIVERS:
THE LEGAL REGIMES OF MAJOR INTERSTATE RIVER SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES 67-97
(2006). The ACF commands a surpringly large entry as well. Id. at 177-89. The history on the
Colorado River is also colorful, including the commissioning of the "Arizona Navy" in the
effort to prevent construction of Hoover Dam. See, e.g., Jon Kyl & Ryan A. Smith, Foreward
to Water Law and Policy Symposium, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 209, 209, 210-216 (2007).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 9-22 (discussing the sources and history of
the conflict).
5 See generally Charles T. DuMars & David Seeley, The Failure of the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin
Compacts and a Guide to the Successful Establishment of Interstate Water Compacts, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 373 (2004).
6 See infra note 22.
7 See Letter from Dirk Kempthome, Sec'y of the Interior, and Jim Connaughton,
Chairman of the Council on Envtl. Quality, to the Governors of Ala., Ga., and Fla. (Mar. 1,
2008), http://www.doi.gov/news/08_News_Releases/080301.html.
8 The following is only a partial list of ACF articles not cited elsewhere. See,
e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for
Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LIrLE ROCK L. REv. 155 (2002); Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing
Resources with Interstate Compacts: A Perspective from the Great Lakes, 14 BuFF. ENVTL.
L.J. 173 (2007); Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12 SE.
ENvTL. L.J. 115 (2004); Carl Erhardt, The Battle over "The Hooch:" The Federal-Interstate
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At the outset, it is important to recognize that there are many parties
with an interest in the ACF basin. The most prominent in recent years are the
three basin states, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. The party with the greatest
physical control in the basin is the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps). Other parties include both the active and passive users of the water.
The uses range from municipal and industrial, to hydropower generation, to
electric power cooling, to irrigation, to navigation, to fisheries, commercial
and sport, riparian and estuarine, to recreation, and to ecosystem services. In
short, the basin is a diverse and complex system.
There have long been two concurrent, and at times competing,
efforts at long-term management. One effort is that of the states to negotiate
a long-term agreement for managing and sharing the basin's waters. The
other effort is that of the Corps, operating its dams in the basin, and that of
those who seek to influence the Corps.9 These latter efforts involve
negotiation or litigation, the goal of which is to affect the Corps' operation of
its controlling dams on the Chattahoochee in a manner that results in a
favorable outcome for the party seeking that influence.' 0 The two efforts do
overlap since the states are among those who negotiate and litigate with the
Corps. Importantly, the states' mutual negotiations are strongly influenced,
Water Compact and the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee River, 11 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 200 (1992); Robert P. Fowler, Jeffrey H. Wood & Thomas L. Casey, III, Maintaining the
Navigability of America's Inland Waterways, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 16 (2006);
Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme Court:
The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 401 (2004);
Arnall Golden Gregory, LLP, Eleventh Circuit Allows Settlement on Lake Lanier Between
Corps and Atlanta Area Governments, 17 No. 4 GA. ENVTL. L. LETrER 3 (2005); C. Grady
Moore, Water Wars: Interstate Water Allocation in the Southeast, 14 NAT. RESOuRCES &
ENV'T 5 (1999); J.B. Ruhl, Water Wars, Eastern Style: Divvying Up the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 131 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 47 (2005); J.B.
Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for a New Water Age,
19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47 (2003); Dustin S. Stephenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling
Waters and Fading Opportunities, 16 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 83 (2000); Jeffrey Uhlman
Beaverstock, Comment, Learning to Get Along: Alabama, Georgia, Florida and the
Chattahoochee River Compact, 49 ALA. L. REV. 993 (1998); Drew Melville, Comment,
"Whiskey is for Drinking": Recent Water Law Developments in Florida, 20 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 489 (2005); Natasha Meruelo, Note, Considering a Cooperative Water
Management Approach in Resolving the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin Water War,
18 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REV. 335 (2007); C. Hansell Watt, IV, Comment, Who Gets the
Hooch?: Georgia, Florida, and Alabama Battle for Water from the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1453 (2003).
9 The first action that precipitated "hostilities" was the determination of the
Corps favoring a further increase in the amount of water it was allowing Atlanta region
municipal water supply entities to store and withdraw. The litigation resulted in a stay order at
that time, see Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1123 (11 th Cir. 2005),
and the Corps did not go forward with permanent water reallocation.
1o See, e.g., Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26, 27, 34
(D.D.C. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1323
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (power companies asserting rights to water for hydropower resulted in a
settlement including the Corps, Georgia, Atlanta water suppliers, and the hydropower
interests; the agreement was nullified on appeal).
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or even upset, as the litigation with the Corps gives one side or the other a
partial victory or perceived advantage.
Unless the three states and the other parties to the dispute embark on
a markedly different approach, there is every reason to think that the ACF
controversy has additional unfulfilling decades ahead of it. There are a
number of key reasons behind this pessimistic view. Most have to do with
the human actors who drive or influence the possibility of a settlement.
Correlatively, there are factors that have to do with institutional
arrangements, primarily the proliferation of fora that have decisional
authority over some aspect of any management plan and their lack of a
common set of governing laws and policies. Finally, there is inadequate
knowledge of exactly how the ecosystem functions, what eventual pattern of
water availability will need to be accommodated by the management options,
and just what population and economic shifts will occur in the region.
Looking at the actors, the first and foremost obstacle to resolving the
ACF dispute is that the states appear to believe that the existing law and
precedents (when to their advantage), rather than sound judgment alone,
should influence the outcome. Each time some advantage is gained in one of
the many available venues (lawsuits, administrative actions, legislation) the
winning parties treat that as a new strength in their negotiating position. Most
recently, Florida and Alabama won a major victory in the D.C. Circuit 2 and
talks described by all sides as promising rather quickly fizzled. 3 Even before
the time to appeal had run, Georgia appears likely to move into an additional
forum - Congress - in seeking to undo the narrow legal point on which the
downstream states victory had hinged.1 4 Second, the parties appear to believe
that there is a static, presently articulable, final result that will adequately
ensure and properly prioritize the region's most vital interests.1 5 Taking these
two points together and stating them in a different way, those key parties are
" See infra text accompanying notes 12-20 (explaining how multiple forums and
competing interests and powers impede resolution of the conflict).
12 Geren, 514 F.3d at 1323.
13 See, e.g., Kevin Spear, Talks Fail as 3 States Try to End Water War, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 2008, at B 1. The failure of the talks came three weeks after the decision in
the Southeastern Federal Power Customers case cited in the previous footnote. See Caldera,
301 F. Supx. 2d 26; see also text accompanying supra note 10.
Proposals are anticipated to be submitted on behalf of Georgia and the Atlanta
municipal water suppliers on Tuesday, March 11, 2008, before the Subcommittee on Water
Resources and Environment of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee that
will make municipal water supply an express purpose of the Buford Dam. See, e.g., Testimony
of Sam Hamilton on Water Resources and the Environment Regarding Drought Issues in the
Southeast, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.fws.govllaws/Testimony/ll0th/20081HamiltonSouth
eastDrought.html.
15 For example, the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact was
intended to provide a formulaic result: "It is the intent of the parties to this Compact to
develop an allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF Basin
among the states while protecting the water quality, ecology and biodiversity of the
ACF .... Apalachicola-Chattahooche-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. 105-104, art.
VII(a), Ill Stat 2219, 2222-23 (1997).
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not willing to fashion and put their trust into a policy-driven mechanism that
will manage the available water soundly based on the best information
available now and in the future. The actions of the parties to date show little
interest in "adaptive management,"' 16 which is likely to be necessary to
achieving a lasting result. The third factor is politics. The governors and
legislatures are constantly trying to score political points by grandstanding
17
and taking aggressive, jingoistic public positions 8 that prevent candid, open-
ended negotiations. Finally, there are well-coordinated vested interests that
benefit from their current levels of use, for example the barge operators and
irrigators in the Flint basin, who have the ability to frustrate a solution by
objecting and each pushing their agenda in a forum that is particularly
responsive to them.
There also is some emerging room for optimism. Almost everyone
dependent on the waters of the basin believes there is not enough water to
support uses on a sustainable level without modification of both their own
practices and those of others. That implies there is room for give on all sides
in a solution that will require more give than take. Similarly, all now seem to
agree that the Corps' operation of the dams under its existing lawful and
possibly ultra vires'9 authority is suboptimal. 20 These factors suggest that
change in bargaining tactics is possible, although not inevitable.
16 Adaptive management is defined as:
A type of natural resource management in which decisions are made as
part of an ongoing science-based process. Adaptive management involves
testing, monitoring, and evaluating applied strategies, and incorporating
new knowledge into management approaches that are based on scientific
findings and the needs of society. Results are used to modify management
policy, strategies, and practices.
Cleanwater.gov, http://water.usgs.gov/owq/cleanwater/ufp/glossary.html (last visited May 11,
2008); see generally ADAPTIVE AND INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT: COPING WITH
COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY (Claudia Pahl-Wostl et al. eds., 2008) (discussing
developments and current controversies regarding water management).
17 See, e.g., CNN.com, Georgia's Governor Prays for Rain on Capitol Steps,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/11/13/southern.drought.ap/index.html (last visited May 11,
2008).
18 See, e.g., Sonny Perdue, Press Release of October 17, 2007, Governor Seeks
Injunction to Protect Georgia's Water Resources, http://gov.georgia.gov/00/press/detail/
0,2668,78006749_96092834 96286007,00.html (last visited May 11, 2008) (endagered
species of fish are less important than Georgia citizens); Bob Riley, Press Release of October
22, 2007, Georgia's Drought Request a Danger to Alabama, http://govemorpress.alabama.
gov/pr/pr-2007-10-22-01-gadroughtreqdanger.asp '(Alabama, citizens would be hurt and
nuclear power plant would close).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 93-97 (explaining judicial interpretations of
statutes governing the Corps' operation of the dam).
20 For example, the Atlanta Regional Commission, whose governmental members
have been the beneficiaries to date of water that the Corps may not have had the authority to
allocate to them, are proposing improvements in the Corps modeling and reservoir operations
of the Woodruff Lock and Dam that would, in turn, create additional flexibility in the
operation of the Buford Dam and Lake Lanier. See DANIEL P. SHEER ET AL., PROPOSED
REVISION TO THE INTERIM OPERATIONS PLAN FOR JIM WOODRUFF LOCK AND DAM FOR THE
20081
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The knowledge of basin characteristics needs to improve. One group,
the Atlanta Regional Commission, has hired a consulting hydrology firm that
has fashioned a more accurate model of the basin inflows and hydraulics.
Using that model, the group has proposed a revised operating plan for the
Corps at the Woodruff Dam and Lock lower in the system that achieves
better results on every parameter of concern for almost every plausible
rainfall scenario.2' That improvement also opens the possibility of using
more of Lake Lanier's water and storage capacity for municipal use. At the
bottom of the basin, several groups led by the Apalachicola Riverkeeper are
seeking funding for more thorough studies of the basin and estuary
ecology.22 These developments will make it easier to get a grounded
assessment of what is possible for the basin and what real points of stress
must be the subject of compromise or a federally imposed settlement.
Negotiations also have a better chance of succeeding because the
stakeholders in the basin are now identified, and most of the larger
constituencies have organized themselves into functioning entities capable of
discussing the problem in a comprehensive fashion. If the stakeholders are
brought into the process, there is less chance that they will attempt to
fragment efforts at a solution by seeking to erect impediments to a larger
plan. This comucopialistic scenario is still a long way off. Considerable
mistrust remains among those groups, and of the states. Likewise, groups
that have been excluded from the negotiations are frustrated and skeptical of
the entire process. Should the process become more inclusive as a means of
gathering broader support, there are entities to work with and they seem
more accepting of the realization that the water is not theirs alone. Hopefully,
they are farther along the road than the politicians in pursing solutions rather
than victories.
I. THE BASIN, ITS WATER CONTROL STRUCTURES, AND THE
COMPETING USES OF THE WATER
Geographically, the basin rises at the north in the Blue Ridge
Mountains and extends southward 385 miles to the Gulf of Mexico. It is
roughly fifty miles in width in most places and drains roughly 19,800 square
IMPLEMENTATION OF "REASONABLE AND PRUDENT MEASURE #3" (2007),
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/ACF%20Water%20Resources%2OManagement/DroughtProv
isionComments/ARCHydrologic_200701 1OWSPRPM3c.pdf. This stands as a marked contrast
to the economic impact study of the commission undertaken in 2000, which showed no
concern for other parts of the basin. See generally GEORGE F. MCMAHON ET AL., LAKE LANIER
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UPDATE: EVALUATION OF WATER SUPPLY, HYDROPOWER,
AND RECREATION BENEFITS (2004) (on file with author).
21 See SHEER ET AL., supra note 20.
22 A proposal for funding and a time frame in which to undertake it are to be
presented on Tuesday, March 11, 2008, before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and
Environment of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Testimony of Sam
Hamilton, supra note 14.
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miles. 23 The Chattahoochee has it headwaters in north-eastern Georgia,
somewhat east of Atlanta, and the Flint has its headwaters in the center of the
state. They merge near the southern and western boundaries of Georgia to
form the Apalachicola, which then flows south through the Florida
panhandle into the Gulf of Mexico. On a river-by-river basis, the drainage is
divided as follows: Apalachicola River - 2,680 square miles; Chattahoochee
River - 8,770 square miles; Flint River - 8,460 square miles. 24
A. Municipal Water for the Atlanta Region
The ACF basin encompasses several distinct regions, which relate to
the kinds of human activities and populations that are present. The most
prominent part of the region is the growing Atlanta metropolitan area at the
very top of the basin. The ACF, and more specifically the upper
Chattahoochee, currently supplies roughly 70% of the water that is delivered
to homes and businesses there.25 The growth in demand had been a function
of growth in regional population, from about 1.5 million in 1960 to over 5
million at present.26 The entire growth has been in the suburban areas where
population density is somewhat lower, but the size of developed parcels
tends to be larger.27 Thus, while household municipal use is largely non-
consumptive, a considerable portion of the Atlanta regional withdrawals of
water from the ACF basin are for landscape and recreation-supporting plant
and lawn irrigation. These uses are highly consumptive and increase the
effect of the Atlanta withdrawal on the downstream users in the ACF basin.
For its part, the Atlanta community is very concerned about the reservoir
level in Lake Sidney Lanier. Groundwater in the region is limited and other
sources, such as the nearby Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa basin, do not have
large surpluses or additional available storage.28 Lake Lanier is, effectively,
Atlanta's largest source of current water, of new water to support growth,
and of stored water that is needed to combat drought periods.29
23 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., WATER ALLOCATION FOR THE
APALACHICOLA-CHATrAHOOCHEE-FLINT (ACF) RIVER BASIN 4-10 (1998), available at
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/pd/actacfeis/acfMain.pdf.
24 Id. at 4-37.
25 See Andrew Thonley, A Tale of Two River Basins: The Southeast Finds Itself
in a Rare Interstate Water Struggle, 9 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 97, 98 (2005).
26 See Demographia, Atlanta Metropolitan Growth from 1960,
http://www.demographia.com/db-atl 1960.htm (last visited May 11, 2008).
27 Id.
28 Atlanta has tried to obtain additional water from Lake Allatoona (another
Corps reservoir) in the ACT basin and encountered similar reactions as with expansion of
Lake Lanier withdrawals.
29 Lake Lanier supports approximately three million people in the Atlanta region,
and Lake Allatoona in the ACT basin supports about 800,000 people in the Atlanta region. See
Tim Eberly & Stacy Shelton, WATER WARS: Feds Tell Three States: We'll Fix This Feud,




For obvious reasons, Atlanta, generally speaking, has an interest in
having as much water stored in Lake Lanier as is possible, consistent with
dam safety and flood control concerns. The Buford Dam that impounds the
water for Lake Lanier was constructed by, and is operated by, the United
States Army Corps of Engineers. Buford Dam originally was authorized by
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945,30 and the authorization was amended the
following year3' to include reference to a Corps report, the Wheeler Report,32
that had formed the rationale for constructing the dam. The Wheeler Report
authorized and allocated costs exclusively for two purposes, flood control
and hydroelectric generation.33 According to Professor Sherk, "[t]he Wheeler
Report suggested that the waters stored in Lake Lanier could be utilized to
provide water for Atlanta. This was not included as an authorized project
purpose, however, and no portion of the costs of the project were allocated to
water supply benefits. 34 Finally, it is apparent that the Buford Dam can
permissibly be managed by the Corps to provide flows in aid of navigation
which is a primary purpose of the downstream dams.35
Although municipal supply is absent from the specific authorized
purposes of Buford Dam, section 301 of the Water Supply Act of 1958,36
after acknowledging the primary responsibility of the states and localities
over their water supply, permitted the Corps or Bureau of Reclamation to
allocate storage in "any reservoir project" to domestic, municipal, or
industrial water supply, so long as the related costs are adequately shared by
the beneficiaries.37 The Corps' discretion to allocate storage to municipal use
is, however, limited by the Water Supply Act to amounts that do not require
major structural or operational changes. 38
30 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, ch. 19, 59 Stat. 10, 17, amended by Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1946, ch. 595, 60 Stat. 634, 635.
31 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1946, ch. 595, 60 Stat. 634, 635.
32 See, e.g., George William Sherk, The Corps' Conundrum: Reconciling
Conflicting Statutory Requirements in the ACF River Basin, in PROCEEDINGS OF 2005
GEORGIA WATER RESOURCES CONFERENCE (Kathryn J. Hatcher ed. 2005), available at
http://www.uga.edu/water/GWRC/Papers/SherkJ%20Corps%20Conundrum.pdf (The Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1946 "adopted by reference a report of Lt. Gen. R.A. Wheeler, Chief of
Engineers. The purposes for which Buford Dam and Lake Lanier were authorized are
referenced in Lt. Gen. Wheeler's report.").
33 This is a debated point. Professor Sherk has researched this point extensively,
and I adopt his conclusions. He points out that the Corps takes a different and somewhat
malleable view of the matter. See George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water
Conflicts in the 21st Century: Is it Time to Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 771 n.21,
781 n.46 (2005).
34 Id. at 782; see also Sherk, supra note 32 (noting the two purposes for which the
Dam was authorized: flood control and hydroelectric generation).
35 Sherk, supra note 33, at 781.
36 43 U.S.C. § 390b(b),(d) (2000).
37 Id. § 390b(d). For a more extended discussion of this provision, see infra text
accompanying notes 86, 89-95 (discussing a D.C. Court of Appeals decision applying the
Water Supgly Act of 1958).
See id.
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Beginning in the 1970's, when drought and growth of water use in
the basin had not been so great, the Corps had allocated "temporary" storage
for water supply in the Atlanta metro region. After a series of single-year
droughts in the 1980's, regional metro Atlanta water suppliers approached
the Corps seeking to obtain a secure water supply that would ensure their
ability to serve their citizenry and continue to grow in population and
economic activity. 39 As described more fully below, that request touched off
full-fledged interstate hostilities over the ACF's waters and the operation of
the Buford Dam.a°
B. Hydropower at Lake Lanier
Hydropower generation is a major element in Buford Dam
operations. The electric power wholesalers who resell power purchased from
the Corps have a significant financial interest in the Corps' operation of the
Buford Dam which is reflected and given legal force by contractual
arrangements. The hydropower interests frequently are at variance with those
of other users, most notably the Atlanta region municipal users. The power
firms buy electricity from the Corps and resell it quite profitably. Since
Congress authorized operation of Buford Dam to provide base load, not
solely peaking power, the power resellers had come to rely on a pattern of
dam operations that ensured regular discharges of the stored water through
the turbines. In times of drought or other shortage, releases for power (that
simultaneously serve as releases for downstream flow) undercut the
municipal users' desires for maximum continued storage as a hedge against
continuing drought or other shortage. Water released through the turbines
reduces the amount of water available for immediate municipal use, and vice
versa. As more fully described below, the power resellers sued the Corps to
ensure that their operation of Buford Dam would conform to authorized
purposes and to ensure that their contracts for power would be honored.4 ' It
was in that context that the State of Georgia, the Atlanta municipal water
suppliers, and the hydropower interests agreed on a management regime for
Buford Dam that was not acceptable to Alabama and Florida.42
39 See Benjamin L. Snowden, Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty:
Understanding the Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134, 139
(2005).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 70-76 (listing highlights of the conflict).
41 See infra text accompanying note 73.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 76-83 (discussing the settlement and
Alabama and Florida's response).
2008]
HAMLINE LAW REVIEW
C. Recreation, Navigation, and Alabama Uses of the
Chattahoochee Mainstem
After the Chattahoochee is released from Buford Dam, there are four
more Corps-operated dams that control the river's flow. These are, from
north to south, the West Point Dam, the W.F. George Dam, the G.W.
Andrews Lock and Dam, and the Jim Woodruff Lock and Dam.43 Another
prominent dam, Georgia Power's Morgan Falls Dam, lies between Buford
and West Point," but its generating operations have not played any role in
the overall dispute, which has focused on the Corps' dam operations. As with
Buford Dam, all of the other Corps dams were constructed with specific
authorizations. These may be summarized as follows:
Table 1 Authorized Purposes of Corps' Dams45
Name of Dam Congressionally Authorized Purposes
West Point Hydro-electric power, flood control, fish and wildlife
recreation, general recreation, and navigation.
George Flood control, navigation, and hydropower project
(peaking only).
Andrews Navigation.
Woodruff Navigation and hydropower production.
These several dams have left the Chattahoochee with no free-flowing
stretches below Lake Lanier and Buford Dam. Thus, any resemblance of the
flows to the natural hydrograph of the river derives from one of two factors.
First, in wetter years the volume of water is so great that releases are required
as the natural rainfall events occur. Second, due to recreation purposes,
including support of fisheries and legal requirements such as the Endangered
Species Act, the Corps may opt to manage the releases to mimic natural
conditions that are favorable to increasing fish and mussel populations.
Physically, the most significant of the lower dams on the
Chattahoochee is the George Lock and Dam. Its maximum water level
differential is eighty-eight feet47 which is enough to create a vast
recreationally important lake that is over eighty-five miles in length, offers
640 miles of shoreline and over 45,000 acres of flatwater surface.48 The lake
43 For a schematic of the basin with links to recent hydrologic data for the dams
and gauging stations, see Apalachicolah-Chattahoochee-Flint River, http://water.sam.
usace.army.mil/acff rame.htm (last visited May 11, 2008).
4 Id.
45 The list of purposes is derived from Sherk, supra note 33, at 782-86; see also
Sherk, supra note 32.
46 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
47 See W.F. George Dam Pertinent Data, http://water.sam.usace.army.mil/ wfg-
pert.htm (last visited May 11, 2008).
4 See Walter F. George Lake and Lake George W. Andrews,
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/op/rec/wfg/ (last visited May 11, 2008).
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and its surrounding areas draw 4.5 million visitors per year. The lake forms
the Alabama-Georgia border throughout its length. The powerhouse in the
dam has four operating units each rated at 32,500 kW.49
The various locks and dams provide an upstream navigation channel
100 feet wide with a nine foot depth that is maintained in some reaches by
dredging. The upstream terminus of the navigation is Columbus, Georgia on
the Chattahoochee and Bainbridge, Georgia on the Flint. These channels
support barge traffic that connects to the Intracoastal Waterway. Alabama
and Georgia are both vociferous in their support for maintaining navigation,
claiming that it is essential to the economic well-being of Alabama's
industrial development as well as farming communities in both states.50 The
extensive dredging to accommodate a relatively small number of barges is
problematic for the Apalachicola River ecology. 51 The dredging disturbs the
riparian habitat and the spoils, mostly sand that is piled on the banks, form
barriers to the river.
D. Flint River Irrigation
If the main event in the ACF is Lake Lanier's operation and the clash
between water for Atlanta and releases for downstream flows, then buried on
the undercard is the increased use of tributary groundwater for irrigation in
the lower Flint basin. The flow of the Flint is largely free, with the only
major structure being the Woodruff Dam and Lock at the very confluence of
the Flint with the Chattahoochee.
It is quite important to compare the Flint's contribution to the water
that will subsequently become the Apalachicola with the contribution
flowing in from the Chattahoochee. Essentially, whatever water flows into
Lake Seminole, the lake created by the Woodruff Lock and Dam at the
confluence of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, is water that the Corps can
manage and release into the Apalachicola River. The United States
Geological Survey has for almost a century maintained a gauge at Newton,
Georgia, which is about forty miles upstream from Woodruff Dam. Newton
is also about twenty-five miles upstream from a recently established gauge at
Bainbridge, Georgia, which is the head of navigation on the Flint and the
furthest upstream reach of the waters impounded at Woodruff. Using the
long-term comparison based on monthly averages compiled over many years
based on the Newton data alone, the Flint accounts for almost 40% of the
inflow at Woodruff.52 Since the Flint gains substantially in the stream stretch
49 See Apalachicolah-Chattahoochee-Flint River, supra note 43.
so Snowden, supra note 38, at 139 and sources cited therein.
51 Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA.
L. REv. 1009, 1053 (2005).
52 See Robert Abrams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives and Nuisance Law:




between Newton and Bainbridge, the contribution of the Flint is closer to
half of the water stored behind the Woodruff Dam.
53
The dominant consumptive use of water in the Flint basin is
irrigation.54 Some irrigators draw water directly from the river, but the bulk
of the irrigation is done by tapping groundwater that is hydrologically linked
to the river and therefore depletes the flow. 55 Most of the irrigation has been
commenced during or after the droughts of the 1980's, in which many
farmers who did not irrigate lost their entire crop.56 The total acreage under
irrigation in 2004, while the basin was still under a four-year-old moratorium
57 58on additional permitting, exceeded 1.5 million acres. That moratorium has
since been lifted, after which additional permit applications that were queued
during the moratorium were granted, and permitting has continued thereafter
based upon the determinations made in the 2006 Flint River Conservation
and Development Plan. 59 The average irrigation depth varied by crop as
follows: "cotton, peanuts, and corn received 6 to 8 inches of water;
vegetables and pecans, 8 to 10 inches; and athletic areas, sod, and nursery
plants, greater than 15 inches."6 The irrigation depletions to the flow come
in the dry summer months when flows are at their lowest, averaging little
more than 3000 cubic feet per second (cfs) at Newton in the first few years of
this century. 61 The amount of irrigation, now somewhere around 350 million
gallons per day on average, is expected to reach 569 mgd by 2050.62
Summer drought adds a double whammy in terms of reducing river flows -
53 For the first four years of operation beginning in 2001, the flows at Bainbridge
averaged 129% of the flows at Newton. Id. at 298.
54 The Georgia DNR put it this way:
Permitted municipal and industrial (M&I) water withdrawals throughout
the FRB [Flint River Basin] total approximately 120 mgd on a monthly
average from surface-water sources (mostly north of the fall line), 88 mgd
from aquifers other than the Floridan aquifer, and 30 mgd from the
Floridan aquifer in Subarea 4. Actual surface water use in 2004 was
approximately 50 mgd (Table 5.3). M&I withdrawals from the Floridan
are equivalent to 3% of the agricultural ground-water use, and thus will
not be discussed in any further detail in this report.
Ga. Dep't of Natural Res. Envtl. Prot. Div., Flint River Basin Regional Water Development
Conservation Plan 15 (2006), http:llwwwl.gadnr.orglfrbp/Assets/DocumentslPlan22.pdf
[hereinafter Flint Plan].
55 See generally id. Professor Glennon puts the reduction in flow at 60% of the
amount pumped. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE
OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 189-90 (2002) (discussing the use of groundwater for farming
irrigation in the ACF basin).
56 See Thomley, supra note 25, at 100.
57 Abrams, supra note 52, at 256.
58 Flint Plan, supra note 54, at 80 (citing Georgia Cooperative Extension Service
Surveys).
59 Abrams, supra note 52, at 256.
60 Flint Plan, supra note 54, at 81.
61 Abrams, supra note 52, at 298.
62 See GLENNON, supra note 55, at 189.
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there is less natural inflow from surface runoff and the amount of irrigation
water applied to the crops increases.
Despite failing to check growth in surface and groundwater permits,
the Flint basin does have a drought management plan that is designed to
fallow land in drought years. The Flint River Drought Protection Act
63
permits the state to purchase forbearance from permit-holding agricultural
users to maintain critical stream flow. Apart from being a bit of a fiscal
albatross, 64 the Flint River Drought Protection Act is unfunded and thus
requires explicit legislative action to appropriate the money. Moreover, there
is a chance that the statute will be inoperative in any year in which the
severity of the drought is not foreseen before March first, the date that marks
the beginning of the spring planting season. On the positive side, Flint basin
permits issued after 2006 will require farmers to use conservation measures
during periods of water shortage, but most of the water is allocated under
older permits that, together, already over-allocate water in times of
shortage.
65
The current operation of the Drought Protection Act is a grim
reminder of the disconnect in Georgia regarding the waters of the ACF basin.
For Georgia purposes the Chattahoochee and the Flint are unconnected
because their confluence is virtually at the border with Alabama and Florida.
Thus, while Atlanta on March 1, 2008, is still wondering what water from
Lake Lanier will be available in summer, on March 1, 2008, the Georgia
Department of Environmental Protection issued an announcement that there
would be no severe drought declaration that would trigger the purchase of
forbearance under that drought protection program.66 The exclusive one-
basin, Flint-only approach is manifested in the consulted criteria:
"[s]treamflow, groundwater levels, winter precipitation and the ninety-day
precipitation outlooks within the lower Flint River Basin are the factors that
determine whether a severe drought is declared. ' 67 The Georgia decision-
makers are not considering the possibility that the Flint's water might
contribute to the solution of the larger ACF problem.
E. Apalachicola River and Bay, Fisheries, and Habitat
As with most rivers, the ecologically richest part of the ACF basin is
the estuary. The Apalachicola River and Apalachicola Bay are very diverse
systems. A multi-year Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Service
study published in 1984 provides a baseline from which the changes
63 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-540 (2006).
64 Abrams, supra note 52, at 258.
65 id.
66 Georgia Department of Natural Resources, http://www.gaepd.org/
FilesPDF/news/FlintRivernewsrelease_2008.pdf (last visited May 11, 2008).
67 Id. (emphasis added).
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associated with the present water conflict can be measured.68 The most
obvious changes in the river and bay are those affecting species - those that
are commercially valuable - the famous Apalachicola Bay oysters, and those
that are endangered - the sturgeon and a small number of varieties of
freshwater mussels.
The cause and effect can briefly be described on a species-by-species
basis. The easiest to understand is the mussels, who can survive in narrowly
defined conditions of water depth. The main cause of their demise is the
dewatering of their habitat by irrigation in the lower Flint. The sturgeon's
case is somewhat more complicated. Like many ocean fish that come into
freshwater for breeding and sheltering, they are adversely affected by the
dredging that affects both channels and streambed areas. More importantly,
they have evolved and adapted to the natural habitat and historic hydrograph
of the river. These species demand a particular flow regime that tends to
mimic the historic flow pattern to ensure successful breeding and the passage
of the young to the ocean. The sturgeon, as a listed endangered species,
impose a direct requirement on the Corps to fashion an operating schedule
that ensures adequate flow at the needed times. In this instance, the needed
accommodation is relatively high flows in the spring that work in opposition
to the desire to hold water in storage for possible summer drought.
Finally there are the oysters of the bay, which live in the estuary's
mixing zone where freshwater and salt water come together. These creatures,
as do the sturgeon, have a life cycle that was evolved over eons of adaptation
to the historic water and shore conditions. Two variables of particular
significance for the oysters are salinity and temperature. Comparatively
speaking, those variables are controlled by the freshwater flows which are
highly variable in comparison to the ocean. With the radical decrease in
outflow during the recurrent ACF droughts, the salinity levels in the Bay also
have changed radically. The oystermen, who represent a $134 million per
year industry, fear that the storage and consumption of water upstream is the
cause of the increased salinity that reduced the 2007 oyster harvest by almost
half.69
6 ROBERT J. LIVINGSTON ET AL., THE ECOLOGY OF THE APALACHICOLA BAY
SYSTEM: AN ESTUARINE PROFILE (1984), available at http://ia360635.us.archive.org/2/items/
ecologyofypalach001ivi/ecologyofapalach00ivi.pdf.
See Florida's Oyster Industry Drying Up? (CBS Evening News television
broadcast Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.cbsnews.constories/2007/11/20/
eveningnews/main3528550.shtml?source=search_ story. Interestingly, the oystermen quoted
in the news report identify Atlanta as the source of the reduced flows and do not mention the
irrigators in the Flint basin.
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H. CONFLICT, MORE DROUGHT, AND MAJOR
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The Seemingly Endless Conflict (Short Version)
To prevent a Sisyphean reading experience, the high points in the
history of the ACF water dispute will be canvassed as a series of bullet
points that are amply described in a host of published materials. 70 The only
items that will be discussed more fully are the most recent court decisions,
one of which invalidates the Corps' planned increases in deliveries for
municipal use in the Atlanta region, and calls into question the legality of
current diversions for that purpose.
" Regional droughts in the southeast in 1981, 1986, and 1988 lead to
increased competition for the available water.7 '
" Prior to 1989 the Corps had provided water to Atlanta area municipal
suppliers pursuant to five-year interim contracts.
* In 1989, the Corps proposes to Congress that it authorize a large,
long-term allocation of Lake Lanier water to the Atlanta
municipalities.
* In response, Alabama sued the Corps in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama; Florida attempted to
intervene in support of Alabama, Georgia attempted to intervene in
support of the Corps.72
* Interim deliveries continued and the parties stayed the case to
undertake negotiations.
* No agreement was reached, but in 1997, the negotiations led to the
formation of the time-limited ACF Compact that was intended to
reach an overall settlement and water allocation.
* In December 2000, Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc., a
nonprofit corporate consortium of rural electric cooperatives, sued
the Corps in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia,73 arguing that the withdrawals being allowed for the
Atlanta municipal suppliers illegally decreased the amount of
hydropower generated at the Buford Dam that was available to their
customers.
* In 2001, Georgia filed its own "local" lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia which was abated
in 2004.74
70 See supra note 8 (listing some of those many sources).
71 See, e.g., Snowden, supra note 38, at 139.
72 See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1123 (1 1th Cir.
2005).
73 Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 00-CV-2975
(D.D.C.).
74 Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 223 F.R.D. 691,699 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
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* In 2001, Georgia and the Atlanta municipal suppliers intervened in
the D.C. lawsuit and the parties were remitted to mediation.
* In early 2003, the D.C. lawsuit parties reached an agreement and
submitted it to the court for approval.
* Alabama and Florida intervened in the D.C. suit to object to the
settlement.
* Alabama and Florida successfully moved to dissolve the stay in the
long-pending Alabama suit.
* After previous agreed extensions, on August 31, 2003, the ACF
Compact was allowed to expire.
* On October 15, 2003, the Alabama court ruled that the D.C.
settlement was void because it was in violation of the 1990 stay
order and barred the Corps and Georgia from executing or
implementing the settlement agreement or entering into any other
agreement.
* In 2004, the D.C. court went ahead and approved the settlement in its
pending litigation, subject to the preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy
Act, a process in which Alabama and Florida would be free to
comment. The D.C. court also held that the settlement could not be
implemented until the parties were able to have the injunction of the
Alabama court dissolved.75
* Both the D.C. and Alabama decisions were appealed, setting the
scene for the appellate decisions of the 1 lth Circuit and the District
of Columbia Circuit. Fortunes were about to change and change
again.
* 2006 was a mild drought year that did not ease tensions.
* 2007 was among the most severe drought years on record and led to
litigation in the Alabama district court resulting in temporary
required releases needed to support endangered species.
1. The 11th Circuit Ruling in Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers
76
This decision begins with a very clear exposition of the legal
wrangling over the ACF basins' waters that had transpired in the three
separate lawsuits.77 The court was reviewing orders of the District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia that, in essence, forbade the Corps and
Georgia from executing the District of Columbia agreement that would allow
75 See Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C.
2004)
76 424 F.3d 1117 (11 th Cir. 2005).
77 Id. at 1122-27.
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increased diversions for Atlanta municipal supply. The court set out and
applied the traditional test for appellate review of preliminary injunctions:
a district court may grant preliminary injunctive relief when
the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying case
when the case is ultimately tried; (2) irreparable injury
during the pendency of the suit will be suffered unless the
injunction issues immediately; (3) the threatened injury to
the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed
injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued,
the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. 78
Under that standard, the 1 lth Circuit found that the injunction was an abuse
of discretion. To the extent that the Corps had breached obligations under the
1990 stay order in the case, the proper remedy was via a show cause hearing
seeking a contempt citation. 79 More substantively, the court found the D.C.
settlement, because it required NEPA compliance, ameliorated any claims of
irreparable injury to Alabama and Florida - the NEPA process was thought
sufficient to protect their ecological interests in preventing future harm.0
Finally, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had not shown likelihood of success
on the merits because the preliminary injunction was based solely upon
alleged violations of the 1990 stay order and that ground appeared likely to
be decided against the plaintiffs.8' What the ruling left open, however, was
the possibility of the filing of both an amended complaint clarifying their
claims and, possibly, adding counts under a variety of statutes.8 2 The
possibility of an amended complaint also created the possibility of seeking a
new preliminary injunction on grounds related to the clarified or new
claims."
At the time it was rendered, the decision of the 1 1th Circuit appeared
to be a significant victory for Georgia and the Atlanta municipal suppliers.
Although they had to undertake an EIS, and would face a renewed challenge
in the remanded proceedings in the litigation, they and the Corps were, for
the moment, free to proceed to implement the agreement that would bring
more water to Atlanta.
78 ld. at 1128-31.
'9 Id. at 1133-34, n.7.
80 Id. at 1134.
81 Id. at 1134-35.
82 Alabama, 424 F.3d at 1135-36.
83 See id. at 1134-35. The appellate court found the lower court's findings on
those issues to be insufficiently thorough and grounded in the record presented.
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2. The D.C. Circuit Ruling in Southeastern Federal Power Customers,
Inc. v. Geren84
Alabama and Florida, who had intervened in the District of
Columbia proceedings to object to the settlement, appealed the adverse
decision of the district court. The approved settlement granted the power
generators "credit to be reflected in hydropower rates" in place of water that
was diverted for continuation of current use and any enlargement of Atlanta
municipal use.86 While the appellants had mounted challenges under three
separate federal statutes, the Water Supply Act (WSA),87 the Flood Control
Act,88 and the National Environmental Protection Act,89 the court of appeals
majority limited its consideration to the WSA claim.9° The panel reversed the
approval of the settlement, even while applying an abuse of discretion
standard of review. 91
The decision turned on the magnitude of the Atlanta municipal
supply withdrawals in relation to the storage capacity of Lake Lanier. The
court noted that the agreement itself had set out the proportions:
The Agreement specifies that Lake Lanier's storage space is
1,049,400 acre-feet. It requires the Corps to allocate between
210,858 and 240,858 acre-feet of Lake Lanier's water
storage to local municipal and industrial uses for a once-
renewable period of ten years; the exact amount of space
allocated depends on whether Gwinnett County chooses to
purchase all of the storage space to which it is entitled. If,
under the Agreement, all of the storage space that may be
officially dedicated to local consumption is, then the
reallocation constitutes more than twenty-two percent (22%)
of the total storage space in Lake Lanier and approximately
nine percent (9%) more of the total storage space than was
being allocated for local use in 2002.92
The court then laid those figures alongside the WSA limitations on
releases in favor of municipal supply that are not expressly authorized
purposes of the reservoir in question. The court first acknowledged the WSA
puts primary responsibility for municipal supply on the states and local
84 Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
85 Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C.
2004). The case took an extra trip to the court of appeals to determine a mootness issue before
returning in Geren. See Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Harvey, 400 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
86 Geren, 514 F.3d at 1320.
87 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) (2000).
88 33 U.S.C. § 708.
89 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f.
90 Geren, 514 F.3d at 1318.
91 Id. at 1321-25.
92 Id. at 1319-20.
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governments, but allows federal reservoirs to help serve that function subject
to a proviso:
Modifications of a reservoir project heretofore authorized,
surveyed, planned, or constructed to include storage as
provided in subsection (b) of this section which would
seriously affect the purposes for which the project was
authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed, or which
would involve major structural or operational changes shall
be made only upon the approval of Congress as now
provided by law.93
Although the court invoked the Chevron94 doctrine, it did not rely
exclusively on de novo review of the statutory interpretation to invalidate the
settlement agreement.95 While finding the statute was clear on its face that
congressional authorization was needed for major operational changes, the
crux of the holding was that the Corps abused its discretion in holding the
reallocation in this case to be non-major.
On its face, then, reallocating more than twenty-two percent
(22%, approximately 241,000 acre feet) of Lake Lanier's
storage capacity to local consumption uses constitutes the
type of major operational change referenced by the WSA;
the reallocation's limitation to a "temporary" period of
twenty years does not change this fact. Even a nine percent
(9%, approximately 95,000 acre feet) increase over 2002
levels for twenty years is significant. Appellees' contrary
arguments are unpersuasive.96
The court specifically addressed and rejected all of the appellees' arguments,
including the claim that this was a continuation of the status quo, not a
change; that 22% was not major; that the specific authorized purpose
(hydropower) had been held harmless by the financial credits given; and that
the agreement is "temporary." The court further hoisted the Corps on its own
petard when it recounted the 1989 Corps proposal that found it necessary and
appropriate to seek congressional authorization for the reallocation of Lake
Lanier's storage.97
93 Id. at 1321-22 (emphasis supplied by the court).
94 The Court stated that:
[Where] Congress has directly spoken to the... issue.., that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress .... [I]f the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
95 Geren, 514 F.3d at 1321.
96 Id. at 1324 (citations omitted).
97 Id. at 1325. The opinion of Judge Silberman concurring in the result was a bit




Now that Alabama and Florida have won the latest victory, but not a
permanent solution, the question becomes, "What next?" The three states
seem to be heading for more conflict in a variety of places, with the next
three stops being in the pending United States District Court litigation, in
Congress, and within the federal bureaucracy. In the courts, both the D.C.
Circuit and the 11 th Circuit opinions do not end the litigation, they just give
direction about what cannot be done. In Congress, Georgia will undoubtedly
try to get congressional authorization for allocating Lake Lanier storage to
municipal supply and Alabama and Florida will be in vigorous opposition.
Finally, in the meantime, the Corps still has to run the river by deciding how
it will operate the dams. 98 Everyone will be watching for the news dejour.99
The remanded litigation will continue to play out on two fronts. As a
prediction, the District of Columbia suit is going to recede into the
background with the repudiation of the "not-quite-global" settlement that
would have given more water to Atlanta and valuable credits to the power
wholesalers. The power wholesalers still have viable claims that the Corps is
not operating Buford Dam in accordance with their rights, and some
monetary/credit settlement of the narrow hydropower claim, divorced from a
long-term operating plan, seems to be the most likely direction for that
litigation. The other ongoing litigation in which the three states are engaged
has been consolidated into a single action that is now pending in the federal
court in Jacksonville, Florida, and being heard by Judge Magnuson, sitting
by designation of the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. That litigation will
now come to the fore.
After remand from the 11 th Circuit, Alabama and Florida were, in
essence, told to amend their original complaint, which has been done.
Among the claims now very clearly stated is a claim against the Corps of
Engineers under the Water Supply Act of 1959, the precise claim that led to
vacatur of the settlement agreement in the D.C. Circuit litigation. Although
the D.C. Circuit case is not binding precedent in this litigation, 1°° its
persuasive force will make it a valuable precedent in arguing for a like result.
defining major reallocation, the starting point that no water should be allocated to municipal
supply. Id. at 1327-28 (Silberman, J., concurring).
98 Spear, supra note 13.
99 One website that has been doing a good job of keeping abreast of that news is
Water Webster, http://www.waterwebster.com/FloridaAlabamaGeorgia.htm (last visited May
11, 2008). In an almost comical response to the setback in the D.C. litigation, Georgia
revisited an old, old grievance dating back to 1818, relating to a flawed survey of its northern
border. If the survey had been accurate, Georgia's border with Tennessee would be placed one
mile farther north and make Georgia a riparian on the Tennessee River, which could then be
tapped for water supply. See, e.g., Greg Bluestein, Thirsty Georgia Wants Big Gulp of
Tennessee, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 9, 2008, at A-5.
100 There is room for Alabama and Florida to argue for preclusive effect. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (concerning issue preclusion).
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While the D.C. Circuit only specifically addressed the settlement agreement
and the increases in diversions for Atlanta, it certainly called into question
the legality of continuation of the current level of diversions. A judgment in
that litigation that invalidates the current level of diversions would force the
Corps, if it has not already done so, to alter operations at Buford Dam.
In Congress, on March 11, 2008, the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment,
held a hearing on the ACF controversy. 101 The members of the House on the
panel and those offering statements and the non-federal witnesses called for a
negotiated settlement protecting all interests and most of those speakers
chided the three state governors for declining to send representatives to the
hearing. The stakeholder speakers made it clear that the drought was causing
real economic consequences in many sectors, from thousands of job losses in
the Atlanta-area landscape sector, to lost agricultural productivity in the Flint
basin, to tourism, fishery, and oystering losses in the Apalachicola River and
Bay. The officials of the Corps reiterated their mandate and described their
process for designing a revised operating manual for the Chattahoochee
dams - they would do what was required under the myriad of laws that
influence their actions. The Georgia legislators and stakeholders who
appeared declined to make specific calls for Corps authorization to
substantially increase the amount of water allocated to municipal supply.
Nevertheless, legislative proposals doing exactly that are almost certain to be
introduced. In general, such one-sided water allocation bills seldom win
approval absent agreement by all of the affected states or their congressional
delegations.10 2
In the third ring of the circus, the federal government was moving
forward on its own, and vowed to do so with or without the States'
participation in the process. Interior Secretary Kempthorne made that much
clear in his letter to the governors when the most recent round of negotiations
failed:
We will now begin a process to review interim operations
that will replace the current program before it expires on
June 1, 2008. Federal agencies may subsequently issue
further revisions as may be warranted by Federal law,
changing hydrological conditions, and new information. Any
future changes in interim operations will be necessary only
until the water control plans and manuals are revised. That
revision process is now beginning and will be organized by
101 Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Water
Resources and Environment - Comprehensive Watershed Management and Planning -
Drought Related Issues in the Southeastern U.S., http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/
hearingDetail.aspx?NewslDf=423 (last visited May 11, 2008). The site has a video of the
entire hearing. Id.
102 See JOSEPH SAX, BARTON THOMPSON, JR., JOHN LESHY & ROBERT ABRAMS,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER REsOURCES 835-36 (4th ed. 2006).
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the Army Corps of Engineers with support from the other
Federal agencies with relevant expertise and jurisdiction.'0 3
The likely meaning of that exemplar of bureaucrat speak is, in this case,
rather easy to predict. The Corps is going to continue its current management
regime until June 1st and then make whatever changes it is compelled to
make by the governing laws. In particular, the Endangered Species Act has
the potential to require a change in operations if the drought continues or
worsens. That, in turn, means the states and interest groups will try and lobby
not only the Corps, but that they will try very hard to influence the current
revision of the Fish and Wildlife Service biological opinion and other studies
of the basin to their advantage. The battle goes on, even if its endpoint may
not be the best resolution of the problem.' °4
As the conflict continues, with small interim victories and losses, the
image of Sisyphus looms larger. As long as the parties employ a process they
believe can lead to a decisive victory, there is always the likelihood of a
decisive loss that cannot be tolerated by the losing side. The losers do not
remain quiescent.., and so the conflict continues or resumes. With that in
mind, it is worthwhile to offer a prescription for better results and a quicker
resolution of the long-term controversy.
The first step is to pick the low-hanging water-use fruit. All users
must seriously conserve and plan for greater water conservation in the future.
Upper basin watering restrictions must be in place in every dry year and must
be imposed early in the year whenever the reservoirs are not as full as
desirable. Drought-resistant landscaping must be encouraged or required.
Georgia must significantly limit dry-year Flint basin irrigation and insist on
conservation by all permit holders. Non-zero sum storage projects have to be
designed and constructed. Impounding water that is tributary to the
Chattahoochee is mostly useless because that water would find its way into
the existing reservoir system anyway. 0 5 In contrast, increasing the Atlanta
region's maximum water storage is not fruitless if it time-shifts the water
availability in a way that supplements Lanier's storage and management
flexibility. Bigger gains are available elsewhere in the system. In particular,
Flint basin water storage, if feasible, would be a very important management
tool. Even small micro projects, such as on farm ponds in the Flint basin, can
make a valuable contribution to meeting all of the regional water needs
simultaneously.
103 Letter from Secretary Kempthorne, Chairman Connaughton to Governors
(Mar. 1, 2008), http:llwww.doi.gov/news/08.NewsReleasesO803Ol.html.
104 Cf. Robert H. Abrams, The Big Horn Indian Water Rights Adjudication: A
Battle for the Legal Imagination, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 71, 86 (1990) (criticizing the effort to
"win" a decisive victory in reserved rights cases).
105 For example, a state-operated dam on a Chattahoochee tributary, upstream of
Lake Lanier, impounds water that Georgia can control, rather than the Corps, but the dam may
not add to the total water available in the top of the system.
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The second step is that a better model of how the basin functions
hydrologically and ecologically must be created and used as the shared basis
for evaluating water management outcomes. Maximizing strategies for
managing the reservoirs under a range of hydrologic conditions must be
comprehensively modeled and assessed. Agreeing on a common model is an
immensely important first step. Having a single model ensures that there is a
consistent data set that everyone is using. From that shared ground, all of the
stakeholders can evaluate the management options and then discuss the pros
and cons of different strategies. Eventually, for long-term management, the
parties have to agree on measures of success/harm, which will further
enlighten the discussion of management options. The eventual series of
operating policies that emerges needs to have been framed across a wide
variety of flow regimes. The most controversial will be how to set extreme
low flow priorities. Importantly, the policies must anticipate the need and
process for amendment. There is no guarantee, and little likelihood, that the
system and the relative importance of uses will remain static.
The final steps lie in recognizing that the nature of the negotiations
must change. The users must unite and push the States and politicians to seek
real solutions. Pure posturing and pandering to voters must end. Public
statements have to reflect the reality that the future will not be the same as
the past, and over-generous expectations about water availability and use are
a historic curiosity. The states have to make the negotiations more inclusive
and transparent. Groups not included in the process have an incentive to try
to derail it with actions taken in a satellite forum. Including a broader array
of interests improves the chances of a maximizing outcome. The states do
not always fully understand the economic and ecological realities of the
water users, whereas the users virtually always do.
The negotiations need to become less adversarial. All parties must
understand there may be some "win-win" opportunities, but that the total
solution will require substantial "lose-lose" compromise. The parties need to
resist the urge to redraw the contours of the playing field by moving parts of
the dispute to what may seem to be a more favorable forum.
The Corps should function as a technical facilitator, not as a
policymaker. Dam operations must, of course, conform to the strict
requirements of federal law, but after that, resource management and policy
should emanate from the states and the users. Where non-essential federal
laws place an impediment to a good solution, amendments need to be
considered and enacted.
There are no sacred cows. Water use of all kinds will cost more,
directly or indirectly. Atlanta must have a substantial allocation of Lake
Lanier water, but Atlanta must accept and embrace permanent and severe
water conservation. The buy-out of the Lake Lanier hydropower interests
must be allowed. Additional storage opportunities must be found. Flint basin
management and restriction of irrigation must be part of the ACF basin
solution. Navigation cannot be a full year, every year, proposition, or it may
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have to be abandoned. Flatwater recreation opportunities must be curtailed
somewhat in dry years. The estuary will not be as productive as it was under
optimal flow conditions. Species recovery plans will be affected.
Even then, Sisyphus will not rest until the reoriented negotiations are
successfully cast into a binding, yet dynamic management agreement.
